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LONG AND SHORT HAUL RULE IN MISSOURI
THE LONG AND SHORT HAUL RULE IN MISSOURI
By CHARLES E. CULLEN
The principal objects of the Interstate Commerce Act were:
(1) to secure just and reasonable charges for transportation;
(2) to prohibit unjust discriminations in the rendition of like
services under similar circumstances and conditions; (3) to pre-
vent undue or unreasonable preferences to persons, corporations or
localities; (4) to inhibit greater compensation for a shorter than
a longer distance over the same line; (5) and to abolish combi-
nations for pooling freights. . . . It is not all discrimina-
tions or preferences that fall within the inhibition of the stat-
ute, . . . only such as are unjust or unreasonable, Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co., (1892),
145 U. S. 263.
This quotation regarding the Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887 in-
dicates the main reasons for most of the state legislation which had
preceded its passage. The states had entered the field of regulation
about twenty years earlier with the so-called "Granger Laws" aimed
at the same abuses. In 1876 the Supreme Court of the United States
had announced the policy that, "Until Congress acts in reference to
the relations of this (railroad) Company to interstate commerce, it is
certainly within the powers of Wisconsin to regulate its fares in mat-
ters of domestic concern," Peik v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 94 U. S.
164. Until this policy was changed in Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific
R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, in 1886, the state regulatory legis-
lation formed the only restraint on the abuses mentioned above in both
intrastate and interstate commerce. The latter decision made neces-
sary the action of Congress, and the Act to Regulate Commerce of
1887 was the result.
In the intrastate field the states continued their regulation, in many
instances affected by local interests and prejudices rather than by sound
economic policy. The product of these prejudices was a body of arbi-
trary regulations which became crystallized in the provisions of new
legislation and new constitutions adopted during the period following
the Civil War down to about 1880, when public opinion, outraged by
what it considered exceptionally unfair treatment, was unusually biased.
This unreasoning attitude toward capital in general, as well as toward
carriers, most of whose troubles could at least superficially be traced
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to unwise financial manipulation or expansion, reflected in the Sher-
man Antitrust Act, the railroad legislation, and similar measures, has
undergone great modification during the last forty years. Change has
been wrought by amending or repealing legislation, or through "rea-
sonable" interpretation by the courts, in the place of positive and rigid
prohibitions. It took twenty years for the courts to point out that
society could not have intended to destroy all combinations of capital,
and had rejected those only which were in unreasonable restraint of
trade. It took thirty-three years to produce a sound attitude toward
transportation.
The Transportation Act of 1920 introduced into the federal
legislation a new railroad policy, Railroad Commission of Wiscon-
sin v. Chicago. Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 257 U. S. 563, 585.
Theretofore the effort of Congress had been directed mainly to
the prevention of abuses, particularly those arising from exces-
sive or discriminatory rates. The 1920 act sought to insure, also,
adequate transportation service. That such was its purpose Con-
gress did not leave to inference. The new purpose was expressed
in unequivocal language. And, to attain it, new rights, new ob-
ligations, new machinery, were created. The new provisions took
a wide range. Prominent among them are those specially designed
to secure a fair return on capital devoted to the transportation
service. The New England Divisions Case, 261 1. S. 184.
The purpose of the Transportation Act of 1920 was to provide for
"the transportation needs of the country, and the necessity
of enlarging facilities," and to enable the carriers to "properly meet
the transportation needs of the public." (Section 422.) Consolida-
tions and pooling of interests or returns had been serious offenses of
the last three decades. The Transportation Act of 1920 recognizes
the economic advantage of and makes provision for the consolidation
of railways into a limited number of systems, and the pooling of traffic
or earnings (Section 407), and the division of joint rates, 257 U. S.
563, supra. Where opinion has been properly guided by study we
have made considerable progress in wise regulation.
The fourth point mentioned in the opening quotation from Inter-
state Commerce Commission v. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co., supra,
formed the subject matter of the famous "Fourth Section" of the
Act to Regulate Commerce of 1887. It read as follows*:
That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to
the provisions of this act to charge or receive any greater corn-
*The italics in all quotations in this article are the author's.
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pensation in the aggregate for the transportation of passengers or
of like kind of property, under substantially similar circumstances
and conditions for a shorter than for a longer distance over the
same line, in the same direction, the shorter being included in the
longer distance; but this shall not be construed as authorizing any
common carrier within the terms of this act to charge and receive
as great compensation for a shorter as for a longer distance; Pro-
vided, however, that upon application to the Commission appointed
under the provisions of this act, such common carrier may, in spe-
cial cases, after investigation by the Commission, be authorized
to charge less for longer than for shorter distances for the trans-
portation of passengers or property; and such designated carrier
may be relieved from the operation of this section of the act.
Section 4, Act of Feb. 4, 1887, 24 Stat. at L. 380.
This section was amended by the Act of June 18, 1910, 36 Stat. at
L. 547, known as the Mann-Elkins Act. So far as our purposes are
here concerned, the changes made were the elimination of the phrase,
"under substantially similar circumstances and conditions"; "the in-
sertion of "or route" after the words, "longer distance over the same
line"; and the addition of "or to charge any greater compensation as
a through rate than the aggregate of the intermediate rates subject to
the provisions of this act," after the phrase, "the shorter being in-
cluded in the longer distance."
In this shape the "Fourth Section" remained until amended by the
Transportation Act of 1920, by the addition after the word "section,"
(fourth word from the end of the original act of 1887) of the follow-
ing:
. . . but in exercising the authority conferred upon it in this
provision, the Commission shall not permit the establishment of
any charge to or from the more distant point that is not reason-
ably compensatory for the service performed; and if a circuitous
rail line or route is, because of such circuity granted authority to
meet the charges of a more direct line or route to or from inter-
mediate points on its line, the authority shall not include intermedi-
ate points as to which the haul of' the petitioning line or route is not
longer than that of the direct line or route between the competi-
tive points; and no such authorizations shall be granted on account
of merely potential water competition not actually in existence.
Section 406, Act of Feb. 28, 1920, 41 Stat. at L, 474, 1. c. 480.
It will be seen from the foregoing that, even in its original form,
the federal regulation made provision for situations in which the strict
prohibition against a "greater compensation . . . for a shorter
distance than for a longer distance," (though clearly stated as not an
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authorization of, "as great compensation for a shorter than for a
longer distance,") would not apply. The amendments down to date
further recognize that there are situations in which the carrier might
justly charge less for a longer than for a short haul, and authoriza-
tion for such charges has been approved by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, "Intermountain Rate Cases," United States v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. R. Co. (1914), 234 U. S. 476; and Murfreesboro Board of
Trade v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (1919), 55 I. C. C. 648; but denied
in "Transcontinental Rate Cases," (1922), 74 I. C. C. 48.
Unfortunately the liberalizing influences evidenced in the history
of the federal control of carriers have not found corresponding recep-
tion in all of the states. Various causes underlie this conservatism,
but it has been largely due to the fact that when restrictions become
fixed in state constitutions and legislation supposedly passed in pur-
suance thereof, they are not easily susceptible of either amendment
or repeal to meet changing conditions. Another preventive is the
reluctance of state supreme courts to change a line of interpretation
or construction adopted in some important decision and followed in
a number of subsequent cases. Again, since the state supreme court's
construction of the provisions of the state constitution are accepted
by the Supreme Court of the United States when no conflict between
the provision itself and the United States Constitution appears, it be-
comes useless to seek relief in that direction.
In Missouri, as in other western states, the abuses of the public
by the carriers were met by restrictive legislation of the early stringent
type. As regards the particular abuse by the carriers in discrimi-
nating unfavorably against the short haul by giving less rates for
longer hauls, at the adjourned session of the Twenty Sixth General
Assembly, which met December 6, 1871, the following act was adopted:
No railroad corporation organized or doing business in this
state, under any act of incorporation or general law of this state,
now in force or which may be hereafter enacted, shall directly or
indirectly charge or collect, for the transportation of goods, mer-
chandise or property on its road for any distance, any larger or
greater amount, as toll or compensation, than is (at the sante)
charged or collected for the transportation of similar quantities
of the same class of goods, merchandise or property over a greater
distance upon the same road, nor shall such corporation charge
different rates for receiving, handling or delivering freight at
different points on its road or roads connected therewith, which
it has a right to use, nor shall any such railroad corporation
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charge or collect for the transportation of goods, merchandise or
property over any portion of its road, a greater amount as toll
or compensation than shall be charged or collected by it for similar
quantities of the same class of goods, merchandise or property over
any such other portion of its road of equal distance; and all such
rules, regulations or by-laws of any railroad corporation as fix,
prescribe or establish any greater toll or compensation than is
hereinbefore prescribed are hereby declared to be void. Section
1, Laws of Missouri, Adjourned Session, 1871-1872, pp. 69, 70.
This act, with the exception of the words "at the same," in the
parenthesis above, appears successively as Section 820, R. S. 1879;
Section 2629, R. S. 1889; Section 1126, R. S. 1899; Section 3173, R. S.
1909; and Section 9974, R. S. 1919. The title of this act was,
"AN ACT to prevent unjust discrimination and extortion in the rates
to be charged by the different railroads in this State, for the trans-
portation of freights on said roads." Its constitutionality was attacked
on the ground that in prohibiting all discriminations and including
other provisions in its other sections, it violated the constitutional pro-
vision, Section 32, Article 4, Constitution of 1865, by being broader
than its title would indicate, but the constitutionality was sustained,
230 Mo. 1. c. 511.
In 1875 Missouri adopted a new constitution, which like others
adopted in neighboring states during this period, contained numerous
restrictions on legislative and corporate action. The detail to which
these provisions go is illustrated by Section 12 of Article 12 of that
instrument, which is devoted exclusively to the "long and short haul"
abuse. It reads as follows:
It shall not be lawful in this state for any railway company to
charge for freight or passengers a greater amount, for the trans-
portation of the same, for a less distance than the amount charged
for any greater distance; and suitable laws shall be passed by the
General Assembly to enforce this provision; but excursion and com-
mutation tickets may be issued at special rates. Section 12, Ar-
ticle 12, Constitution of 1875. (Italics are ours.)
The act of 1872 is a rigid prohibition of greater compensation for
a short than for a longer haul. The first part of the above consti-
tutional provision seems fully as rigid. The one specified "over any
other portion of its road," the other, "any greater distance." It would
seem from the language used in both that no two hauling situations, re-
gardless of how distant from each other, or diversity of ease or diffi-
culty of transportation, or plentifulness or scarcity of freight, would
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seem to permit of a greater compensation for the shorter than for the
longer haul. But what were suitable laws under Section 12 must be
determined.
Fifteen years after the act of 1872, and twelve years after the adop-
tion of the new constitution, the federal government enacted the Act
to Regulate Commerce. Its provisions, as we have seen, were not so
drastic as the earlier state laws. The "Fourth Section" prohibition
was qualified by such phrases as: "like kind of property"; "under
substantially similar circumstances and conditions"; "over the same
line"; "in the same direction"; and "the shorter included in the longer
distance." Fifteen years and a sounder economic viewpoint had at
least slightly mellowed opinion.
That like modification was desirable in Missouri was evidently rec-
ognized by the General Assembly of 1887, for it passed an act, the
main portion of which, was in substance the first part of Section Four
of the federal act, as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any such common carrier to charge or
receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for the trans-
portation of like kinds of property under similar circumstances and
conditions for a shorter than a longer distance over the same line
in the same direction: Provided, however, that nothing contained
in this section shall apply to the carriage, storage or handling of
property, either free or at reduced rates, for the United States,
for the state of Missouri, or for any fair, exposition, religious,
scientific, benevolent, or charitable purposes. Laws of Missouri,
Extra Session, p. 17; appearing as Section 2637, R. S. 1889; Sec-
tion 1134, R. S. 1899; Section 3185, R. S. 1909; Section 9986,
R. S. 1919.
Unfortunately the act of 1872 was not expressly repealed. It had
been included in the revision of 1879 (Section 820), and in the re-
vision of 1889 (Section 2629). Thus after 1887, the state had three
provisions: the act of 1872, the constitutional provision of 1875, and
the act of 1887, all bearing directly on the "long and short haul" prob-
lem, besides auxiliary acts imposing penalties for breach of the reg-
ulatory laws and another provision of the Constitution of 1875, Section
14 of Article 12. There was no provision in the Constitution of 1865
similar to either Section 12, set out above, or Section 14, which reads
as follows:
Railways heretofore constructed, or that may hereafter be con-
structed in this State, are hereby declared public highways, and
railroad companies common carriers. The General Assembly shall
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pass laws to correct abuses and prevent unjust discrimination and
extortion in the rates of freight and passenger tariffs on the dif-
ferent railroads in this State, and shall from time to time pass
laws establishing reasonable maximum rates of charges for the
transportation of passengers and freight on said railroads, and
enforce all such laws by adequate penalties.
Here would seem to be a sufficient authority for the General As-
sembly to pass suitable legislation to correct any unjust discrimina-
tions on a proper economic basis, and to determine that any discrimi-
nation between long and short hauls, merely as such, was not neces-
sarily unjust.
Since the passage of the act of 1887, litigation with reference to the
long and short haul clause has hinged around its effect upon the act
of 1872. As indicated heretofore, both survived in the successive
revisions of the statutes. The litigation over the "long and short haul"
law in Missouri is a striking example of the obstacles facing the adapta-
tion of regulatory measures to a changed and enlightened economic
viewpoint. It has taken until August 13, 1926, to overcome the effect
of conservatism and adherence to precedent.
In 1903 the act of 1872 came before the supreme court of the state
in an action of McGrew v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. for the re-
covery of excess charges on coal from Myrick, the point of shipment,
to Kansas City, a distance of 42.3 miles, the rate being fifty-five cents
per ton. The rate at the same time from Myrick to Boonville, a dis,
tance of 77 miles, was forty cents per ton. The court ruled that a
demurrer to the petition was wrongfully sustained by the lower court,
and specifically determined that the act of 1872 was not repealed by
the act of 1887. Judge Gantt wrote the opinion which decided that
the two acts would stand together, the former covering all instances
of such discrimination, and the latter those of the kind specified. The
decision of the case on retrial was in accord with this opinion, 118 Mo.
App. 379. The opinion was also followed in Cohn v. St. Louis, I. M.
& S. R. Co., (1904) 181 Mo. 30.
The carriers continued to regard the act of 1887 as controlling, and
McGrew again sued to recover excess charges, the case reaching the
supreme court in 1910. One of the judges was disqualified, and the
other six divided equally, so a special judge was called upon. Hon.
Willard P. Hall was chosen, and the opinion, in a four to three de-
cision written by him, is to be found in 230 Mo. 496.
Excluding the contentions regarding the legality of those laws at-
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lowing recovery of attorney's fees and penalty damages, the grounds
of appeal were as follows:
1. That the Act of 1872 (now Section 9974, R. S. Mo. 1919), was
in violation of Section 32, Article 4, of the Constitution of 1865.
2. That it was repugnant to and in violation of Section 14, Article
12, of the Constitution of 1875.
3. That both the Act of 1872, and Section 12, Article 12, of the
Constitution of 1875, were in conflict with the Constitution of the
United States.
4. That the Act of 1872 had been repealed by the Act of 1887,
(now Section 9986, R. S. Mo. 1919).
As indicated before, the first contention was overruled and the act was
held not invalid because its title could be held to be no broader than its
content.
The majority ruled with regard to the second point, that it was
not repugnant to Section 14 of Article 12. Despite the fact that both
Sections 12 and 14 had been copied from the Constitution of Illinois
of 1870, and legislation in furtherance of both had been declared un-
constitutional, Judge Hall distinguished the conditions of their ap-
plication in Missouri. His chief argument was that "long and short
haul" provisions were being considered both before and after the adop-
tion of Section 12 by other states, which were revising their constitu-
tions. Most of those states, both before and after our adoption, adopted
provisions similar to those of our act of 1887, but Missouri, with full
knowledge of such modifications retained the stricter language." The
language of our constitution, so widely different from all the others
in these respects, was not a mere accident, but indicates a fixed and
settled purpose and intention to establish a rigorous and unalterable
and unvarying short-haul rule as the policy of the state." 230 Mo.
1. c. 521, 522.
Thirdly, the decision pointed out, following L. & N. Railroad Co. v.
Kentucky, 183 U. S. 503, that "in the absence of a valid agreement pro-
tecting it from interference on the part of the state in this regard
(if indeed such an agreement could be made, which was not decided)
a railroad company has no constitutional right to discriminate either
between individuals or localities, and the state has the constitutional
power to prohibit absolutely such discriminations," and held that the act
of 1872 and section 12 of the Constitution were not in conflict with
the federal Constitution.
Fourth, as regards the contention that the act of 1887 repealed the
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act of 1872 by implication, Judge Hall followed Judge Gantt's de-
cision of 177 Mo. 533, and rejected repeal by implication. Speaking
for the majority he also decided that Section 12 of Article 12 was
self-enforcing; and even if the act of 1872 were repealed, a shipper
needed no legislation to enable him to recover for its breach.
The finality with which these principles were laid down is some-
what marred by the able dissent of Judge Woodson. The prevail-
ing opinion covers 65 pages, the dissent 50 pages, 230 Mo. 496-612.
Apparently the matter was settled and the rulings of this case were
followed in McGrew v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., (1914) 258 Mo. 23,
and McGrew v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., (1919) 280 Mo. 466.
Two cases of McGrew Coal Company v. Missouri Pacific R. Co.
(memorandum decisions, No. 17317, and No. 17318, decided June 29,
1915, rehearings denied July 12, 1915, reported in 178 S. W. 1179)
the second by stipulation to abide the decision in the first, were taken
to the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of error and
affirmed by that court, May 21, 1917. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Mc-
Grew Coal Co., 244 U. S. 191. Quoting the statement of the supreme
court of Missouri, 230 Mo. 561:
Section 12 of Article 12 of our Constitution clearly establishes
an unconditional short-haul rule, without regard to direction or to
circumstances and conditions. Said section declares that it shall
be unlawful for any railroad company to charge for the trans-
portation of freight or passengers a greater amount for a less
distance than the amount charged for any greater distance. That
declaration establishes a rule and creates a right in every passen-
ger and shipper to a compliance with, and an obedience to its
terms. . . . Said section has the same force and effect as if
it read, "It shall not be lawful in this State for any railroad com-
pany to charge, under penalties which the General Assembly shall
prescribe, for freight or passengers a greater amount for the trans-
portation of the same, for a less distance than the amount charged
for any greater distance. Had said section read that way, its ef-
fect as an operative law would have been too clear for contro-
versy." To my mind it is equally clear under the present reading.
Mr. Justice McReynolds, delivering the opinion of the court, stated
that the state court's interpretation of the constitutional provision made
it unnecessary to consider the validity of the statutes which the railroad
claimed were unconstitutional. He also sustained the interpretation
of Judge Hall as to the effect of Louisville and N. R. Co. v. Ken-
tucky, 183 U. S. 503, on the constitutionality of such legislation, in
the absence of any controlling contract or protecting charter.
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The absolute prohibition of any greater charge for a short haul
than a longer haul regardless of any other consideration than mere
mileage, seemed fixed in Missouri.
In 1920 another action was brought by the McGrew Coal Company,
this time against Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads, for
recovery of excess freight charges for the transportation of coal from
plaintiff's mines to various points on the lines of the Missouri Pacific
Railroad Co. James C. Davis and Andrew C. Mellon were successive-
ly substituted as successors in official capacity to Mr. Hines. The first
count alleged, that, on December 28, 1917, plaintiff shipped 354,600
pounds of bituminous coal over the lines of the Missouri Pacific Rail-
road Company from Myrick to Archie, both in Missouri, and that
the Director General charged and collected . . . 90 cents per ton
by the carload, when said Director General at the time collected for the
same class of coal, and over the same railroad, the rate of 60 cents per
ton by the carload from Liberal, Mo., to Granby, Mo., a greater dis-
tance than from Myrick to Archie. There were 168 counts in the pe-
tition, each based on a separate shipment, alike in tenor, but differing
in the facts of shipment.
The case reached the supreme court on appeal by the defendant
from a decision in the lower court and the court sat en banc on the
case. On August 13, 1926, a unanimous opinion, prepared by Chief
Justice Blair, was handed down, and a rehearing was denied, October
8, 1926. The decision, which is a complete reversal of opinion on the
principal points theretofore adjudicated, is to be found in McGrew Coal
Company v. Mellon, 287 S. W. 450.
The appellant railroad company had asked the court to again con-
sider the points which had been decided in what the court calls the
"Hall decision," to distinguish it from the numerous other McGrew
v. Missouri Pacific Railroad cases, and the validity of the act of 1872,
and the self-enforcing features of Section 12, were carefully examined.
It was decided that the act of 1887 (Section 9986, R. S. 1919), did
repeal the act of 1872 (Section 9974, R. S. 1919), and Judge Gantt's
decision to the contrary, followed by Judge Hall, was directly over-
ruled. The court said that to conclude otherwise, "convicts the Thirty-
Fourth General Assembly of wasting its time in doing a silly and use-
less thing. . . . Under the maxim, inclusio unius est exclusio al-
terius, it was not unlawful under the 1887 act, for a railroad to charge
more for a short haul than for a longer haul, if the two hauls were in
different directions, and the circumstances and conditions thereof were
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not the same." "However, if the foregoing considerations may fairly
be said to leave any doubt that the 1872 act is no longer in force, what
doubt can possibly remain since the passage in 1913 of the Public Serv-
ice Commission Act? Section 47, Laws of 1913, p. 583, (now Sec-
tion 10456, R. S. 1919) provides, in substance, that, when the commis-
sion shall be of opinion, after a hearing, that the rates, fares or charges
demanded, exacted, charged, or collected by any railroad for the trans-
portation of persons or property in this state are, among other things,
"unjustly discriminatory," the commission shall determine the just
and reasonable rates, fares, and charges to be thereafter observed and
in force. No logical conclusion can be reached other than that it was
the intention of the Forty-Seventh General Assembly thereafter to
leave to the commission the entire subject and field of rate regulation,
including unjust discriminations and other abuses, without the commis-
sion being in any wise bound by previous legislative enactments upon
the subject which had not been expressly repealed. If this is the cor-
rect view, and we doubt not that it is, then the 1872 act, even though
not repealed by implication by the 1887 act, and the 1887 act as well,
were swept into the discard, and were repealed by necessary implica-
tion by the enactment of the Public Service Commission Act."
With regard to the second contention, the court said: "The cor-
rectness of the judgment below therefore depends solely upon the
soundness of Judge Hall's conclusion that Section 12, Article 12, of
the 1875 Constitution is self-enforcing, and in itself made the al-
leged excessive charges unlawful, and gave the shipper a cause of
action therefor without the aid of 'suitable laws.'" After setting out
Judge Hall's statement, set forth as cited by Mr. Justice McReynolds
in 244 U. S. 191, supra, the court says, "There could be no question
concerning the correctness of his conclusion were it not for the clause
providing that the General Assembly shall pass suitable laws to enforce
said provision; that is Section 12, Art. 12, as a whole." On the theory
that "Constitutional provisions are not self-executing . . if it
appears from the language used and the circumstances of its adoption
that subsequent legislation was contemplated to carry it into effect,"
it is decided that, "It is clear from the language of Section 12, Art.
12, itself that it was the intention of the framers of the provision that
it was not to go into effect immediately. If it was their intention that
it should go into immediate effect, why the proviso that the General
Assembly should pass suitable laws to enforce it."
As there was no valid legislation in force to justify the decision of
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the lower court, and since Section 12, Art. 12, is not self-enforcing, the
judgment for the plaintiff was reversed. "It results that the cases
of McGrew v. Railroad, 230 Mo. 496, 132 S. W. 1076, and McGrew
v. Railway Co., 177 Mo. 533, 76 S. W. 995, and our subsequent deci-
sions which have followed them, must be, and are, overruled, in so
far as such cases are out of harmony with our opinion. (This covers
258 Mo. 23; 178 S. W. 1179 (two cases), 280 Mo. 466, and others
dependent on the two expressly overruled.)
The court recognizes the progress made elsewhere, which marks the
changes in view discussed in the first part of this article in the fol-
lowing words: "The 1887 act and the later Public Service Commis-
sion Act of 1912 are in harmony with legislative action in other states,
with the construction placed upon the federal long and short haul stat-
ute and with the principles of rate-making authorities generally."
As the court definitely decided that there was no statute now in
effect to cover the short and long haul problem, both having been re-
pealed by implication by the Public Service Commission Act, both acts,
now Sections 9974 and 9986, were repealed expressly by the Fifty-
Fourth General Assembly in the session of 1927, and a new section
9986-was enacted, and approved March 11, 1927, which is as follows:
It shall not be lawful for any railway company in this state
to charge or receive any greater compensation in the aggregate for
the transportation of passengers, or of like kind of property, for
a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line or route
in the same direction, the shorter being included in the longer
distance, or to charge any greater compensation as a through
rate than the aggregate of the intermediate rates, but excursion and
commutation tickets may be issued at special rates. Laws of 1927,
p. 385.
This is practically the same as the first part of the Fourth Section of
the Interstate Commerce Act as it is today, and is the present condition
of the "long and short haul" rule in Missouri. It has taken a long
time to bring it up to date, and the present supreme court is to be con-
gratulated on facing the issue though it involved a repudiation of well
entrenched precedents.
Washington University School of Law.
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